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LEGISLATION-APPLICATION OF MERCANTILE LICENSE TAX TO LAWYERS--
The Philadelphia City Council passed an ordinance entitled "AN ORDINANCE-
To provide for revenue by imposing a mercantile license tax on persons en-
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gaging in certain businesses including manufacturing, professions, occupations, 
trades, vocations, and commercial activities in the City of Philadelphia. • . ." 
Under this ordinance the city required lawyers to register, pay a registration fee, 
and pay a tax on a percentage of their gross volume of business; thereupon, 
"mercantile licenses" were issued to them. The city charter required each 
ordinance to deal with one subject only and to express that subject in the title. 
The application of the ordinance to lawyers was attacked under the sponsorship 
of the Philadelphia Bar Association, and the lower court enjoined enforcement 
against lawyers. On appeal, held, reversed. Sterling v. Philadelphia, 378 Pa. 
538, 106 A (2d) 793 (1954). 
The taxation of lawyers for revenue purposes is not an unconstitutional in-
vasion of the judicial sphere by the legislative branch of government.1 It is 
reasoned that lawyers as citizens must bear their fair share of the tax burden 
along with all others.2 In this context, the lawyer is not considered an "officer 
of the court" or a "public official."3 The power in the judiciary to set the 
qualifications for the bar does not preclude the legislature from taxing members 
of the bar; in fact, historically, the very status of "attorney" was created by 
statute.4 Today, the power to license attorneys is upheld if the licensing is in-
terpreted as a revenue and not a regulatory measure. 5 The power of a munici-
pality to levy taxes is derived from the power of the state by direct grant,6 by the 
terms of a municipal charter, 7 or by implication from the absence of a statute 
prohibiting municipal taxation. 8 
The particular ordinance presents problems because of two provisions: 
the charter limitation that a bill must embody only one subject which, in turn, 
must be expressed "clearly and adequately" in its title,9 and the provision of 
the Pennsylvania Statutory Construction Act directing that tax measures be 
1 Goldthwaite v. City Council of Montgomecy, 50 Ala. 486 (1874); Lister v. City of 
Fort Smith, 199 Ark. 492, 134 S.W. (2d) 535 (1939); 16 A.L.R. (2d) 1228 (1951). 
2 4 CooLEY, THELA.w OF TAXATION, 4th ed., §1704, p. 3415 (1924). 
3 In re Galusha, 184 Cal. 697, 195 P. 406 (1921); Newlin v. Stuart, 273 Ky. 626, 
117 S.W. (2d) 608 (1938). It has been held that an attomey is not an officer of the state 
in the sense that his actions are not to be regarded as "state action" for purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Berg v. Cranor, (9th Cir. 1954) 209 F. (2d) 567. 
4 C1wm, A HISTORY oF ENGLISH LA.w 351 (1831); Lee, ''The Constitutional Power 
of the Courts Over Admission to the Bar," 13 HARv. L. REv. 233 at 238 (1899). 
5 In re Johnson, 47 Cal. App. 465, 190 P. 852 (1920); McCarthy v. Tucson, 26 
Ariz. 311, 225 P. 329 (1924). A license tax on lawyers was held invalid in Hill v. City 
of Eureka, 35 Cal. App. (2d) 154, 94 P. (2d) 1025 (1939). See also 1912A Ann. Cas. 597. 
The many cases on this point tum not only on the unique wording of the particular statutes 
involved, but also upon the courts' willingness or reluctance to accept the purpose of the 
measures as stated by the legislatures. Of course, even a tax for revenue purposes may 
be so exorbitant as to be unreasonable and confiscatory. Newlin v. Stuart, note 3 supra. 
The cases are split on whether the payment of the tax can be made a condition precedent 
to practicing law. Wright v. Atlanta, 54 Ga. 645 (1875); Shepherd v. Little Rock, 183 
Ark. 244, 35 S.W. (2d) 361 (1931). 
6Davis v. Ogden City, 117 Utah 315, 215 P. (2d) 616 (1950). 
7 Abraham v. City of Rosenberg, 55 Ore. 359, 105 P. 401 (1909). 
s Barrett v. State, 44 Ariz. 270, 36 P. (2d) 260 (1934). 
9 Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, §2-201, approved April 17, 1951. 
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strictly construed.10 One of the primary purposes of the title limitation is to 
insure that notice of the legislation is given the public. Although such limita-
tions often are liberally construed,11 no state constitution has a provision which 
goes so far as to demand that the subject be "clearly and adequately" ex-
pressed.12 Adding to the strictness of the language in the charter the fact that 
a city council is a lesser political organ, it can be argued that this title provision 
was meant to be more strictly construed. Unless the word "mercantile" be 
regarded as surplusage, the title does not give notice to lawyers that the ordinance 
applies to them. If the word "mercantile" is ignored, what remains is an ordi-
nance which authorizes the city to tax everything.13 Such an ordinance would 
_ be beyond the power of the city of Philadelphia, 14 although the severability 
clause could be used by the courts to cut down the scope of the ordinance to 
conform to the limits of municipal power. It seems more consistent with the 
aims of good government, however, to presume that the council intended the 
word mercantile to have its traditional meaning, thereby limiting the tax, than 
to presume that it intended to pass an omnibus bill and depend upon the courts 
to delineate it. The majority of the court, however, felt that the intent of the 
council was clear, notwithstanding its designation of the measure as a mercantile 
license tax.15 The point which is of ~oncem to lawyers, and which provoked 
Justice Musmanno's sharp dissent, is the clear implication of the court's holding: 
if the license tax is applicable to lawyers, and if the ordinance conforms to the 
mechanical requirements of title, then the practice of law is a business of a 
mercantile character. This is a dramatic departure from the attitude of several 
centuries of lawyers-and non-lawyers.16 The result may reflect a general 
10 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1952) tit. 46, §558, held applicable to municipal corpora-
tions in Breitinger v. Philadelphia, 363 Pa. 512, 70 A. (2d) 640 (1950). 
llSUTHBBLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCI'ION, 3d ed., §1704 (1943). 
12 Twenty-three states say merely that the subject or object of the law shall be "ex-
pressed" in the title: Amz. CoNsT., art. 4, §13; CAL. CoNsT., art. IV, §24; DBL. CoNST., 
art. 2, §16; GA. CoNST., art. III, §VII, c. 2-19, §2-1908; IDAHO CONST., art. 3, §16; Ir.r.. 
CoNST., art. IV, §13; IND. CoNsT., art. 4, §19; IowA CoNST., art. 3, §29; KY. CoNsT., 
§51; Ml:cH. CoNsT., art. V, §21; MINN. CoNST., art. 4, §27; N.J. CONST., art. 4, §7, ,r4; 
N.Y. CONST., art. 3, §15; N.D. CONST., art. II, §61; Oro!. CONST., art. IV, §20; s.c. 
CoNsT., art. 3, §17; S.D. CoNST., art. III, §21; TENN. CoNsT., art. 2, §17; Tm:. CoNST., 
art. 3, §35; VA. CONST., art. IV, §52; WASH. CONST., art. 2, §19; W.VA. CONST., art. 
VI, §30; Wis. CoNsT., art IV, §18. Twelve states require that the subject be "clearly 
expressed": ALA. CoNST., art 4, §45; CoLo. CoNsT., art. V, §21; KAN. CONST., art. 2, 
§16; Mo. CONST., art. 3, §23; MoNT. CoNsT., art. V, §23; NEB. CoNST., art. III, §14; 
N.M. CoNST., art. IV, §16; Omo CoNsT., art. II, §16; OKLA. CoNsT., art. 5, §57; PA. 
CoNST., art. 3, §3; UTAH CoNsT., art. VI, §23; WYo. CoNsT., art. 3, §24. Two states 
require that the subject be ''brieHy expressed": FLA. CoNsT., art. III, §16; NBv. CONST., 
art. IV, §68; and one state each requires that the subject be "indicated": LA. CoNST., art. 
3, §16; "described": MD. CoNST,, art. 3, §29; and "indicate clearly'': Miss. CoNsT., art. 
4, §71. 
13 In fact, in Philadelphia it has been called the ''Tax Everything Act." 
14 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1954) tit. 53, §§2015.1 to 2015.8. 
15 Principal case at 794. 
16 Pound, ''What Is a Profession? The Rise of the Legal Profession in Antiquity," 19 
NoTRB DAME LAWYER 203 (1944). 
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opinion of society which, in mid-twentieth century, allegedly17 finds little dis-
tinction ~tween the practice of law and the operation of a mercantile business. 
It is to be hoped that, tax or no tax, Philadelphia lawyers continue to adhere to 
standards well above those of the market place. 
Edward H. Hoenicke 
17Gossett, "Human Rights and the American Bar," 22 AMERICAN SCHOLAR 411 
(1953). 
